CANE: The Content Addressed Network Environment by Gardner-Stephen, Paul
ar
X
iv
:0
71
0.
50
06
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 26
 O
ct 
20
07
CANE: The Content Addressed Network
Environment
Paul Gardner-Stephen (gardnersinfoeng.inders.edu.au)
24th Otober 2018
Abstrat
The fragmented nature and asymmetry of loal and remote le aess
and network aess, ombined with the urrent lak of robust authentiity
and privay, hamstrings the urrent internet. The olletion of disjoint
and often ad-ho tehnologies urrently in use are at least partially re-
sponsible for the magnitude and poteny of the plagues besetting the
information eonomy, of whih spam and email borne virii are anonial
examples. The proposed replaement for the internet, Internet Protool
Version 6 (IPv6[13℄), does little to takle these underlying issues, instead
onentrating on addressing the tehnial issues of a deade ago.
This paper introdues CANE, a Content Addressed Network Environ-
ment, and ompares it against urrent internet and related tehnologies.
Speially, CANE presents a simple omputing environment in whih
loation is abstrated away in favour of identity, and trust is expliitly
dened. Identity is ryptographially veried and yet remains pervasively
open in nature. It is argued that this approah is apable of being gen-
eralised suh that le storage and network aess an be unied and sub-
sequently ombined with human interfaes to result in a Unied Theory
of Aess, whih addresses many of the signiant problems besetting the
internet ommunity of the early 21st entury.
1 Introdution
What are the real problems with the internet today? Is the internet user base
most autely pressed by the impending exhaustion of the IPv4[1℄ address spae?
Is it perhaps that the urrent Internet Protool Version 4 (IPv4) has trouble
with sending more than a few giga-bytes in a single session? Maybe it is that
65,536 ports per host just isn't enough? Or is it that getting alloated an
IP address and nding the grass roots network servies you require on a new
network, suh as DNS, is too hard?
While these are problems with the urrent internet, they are not impassible
road bloks in the progress of the so alled information soiety or information
eonomy. These problems have been mitigated by new tehnologies suh as
network address translation and PPP. Indeed, IPv6 primarily targets tehnial
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issues whih have already been mitigated. Although these issues may remain
important, they are no longer the most pressing issues faing the internet to-
day. Thus, there is no universally ompelling advantage or reason to make the
transition from IPv4 to IPv6, explaining why IPv6 is still not in extensive use
a deade after its release.
If it is not the tehnial issues addressed by IPv6 that are the bugbear of the
internet then this logially implies that there are other problems whih need to
be identied and addressed; IPv6 fails to address the real problems faing the
internet in the 21st entury.
The strit traditional denition of the internet as the global inter-network
of omputers is too narrow and tehnial to be eetive here. I suggest that
the a more useful denition of the internet is the global inter-network of agents
(human or artiial) ommuniating using omputers. This dierene highlights
the reality that the outstanding problems of the urrent internet lie in the inter-
ation of agents (human or artiial), not omputers. The internet should make
it simple for people using omputers to do what they want to do. If they want
to aess and modify data, then they should not be hampered by their loation
or that of the data. They may also want to do this with appropriate seurity
and privay. All other uses of the internet (aording to our denition of it)
are derivatives of this. Consider the following two examples: (a) publishing web
pages; and (b) email.
The rst example, publishing web pages (in its simplest form) an be mod-
elled as providing globally unrestrited read-only aess to a olletion of les. In
the urrent internet this is implemented using a speial program (the web server)
to make the pages available, and another speial program (the web browser) to
read the pages.
The seond example, email, an be modelled as writing a le you have re-
ated (the message) into a well known writable loation in the reipients storage
(their email inbox). In the urrent internet this is implemented using a spe-
ial program (an email omposing and sending program) whih ommuniates
to another speial program (the email delivery server) using a speial protool
(usually SMTP), whih plaes the message into a speial kind of storage (the
reipients email inbox, whih usually exists outside the name spae of the reip-
ients regular le storage). The reipient then uses a speial program (an email
reading program, whih is probably integrated into the email omposing and
sending program) to talk to another speial program (the email aess server)
using another speial protool (usually POP or IMAP) to retrieve the messages
and display them to the user.
Now onsider how these examples might look if there was a protool whih
made it possible to aess remotely stored data as though it were loally stored,
inluding read and write aess, as well as the enforement of user stipulated
permissions.
The rst example, publishing web pages would be aomplished by making
a olletion of les globally readable. The pages ould be aessed by the reader
using the same tools they use to explore and aess les stored on their own
omputer. Thus the result is a simpler and more onsistent arhiteture.
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The seond example, email, would be aomplished by writing a le to a
well known loation (their email inbox) in the reipients storage. However,
we an go further with email by reating additional delivery loations (per-
haps sub-diretories of the well known loation), and plaing restritive per-
missions on them. You ould reate a friends folder that only aepts email
messages from a list of known senders. The email address notation ould be
rened to take this into aount, e.g., by allowing email addresses suh as
paul/friendsinfoeng.inders.edu.au. While Spammers ould still deliver mes-
sages to paulinfoeng.inders.edu.au, only people I speify ould deliver mes-
sages to paul/friendsinfoeng.inders.edu.au.
In short, by hanging the internet from a omputer entri olletion of
speialised programs and protools to a simplied entity entri model it is
possible, not merely to remove omplexity, but to add substantial value to the
internet. The remainder of this paper visits, in more detail, the issues touhed
on in this setion, namely the real problems with the internet, and the need for
an alternative (Setion 2). Suh an alternative is proposed and is desribed in
two parts: (1) simplifying data aess (Setion 3); and (2) making the internet
entity entri instead of omputer entri (Setion 4).
2 The Real Problems With The Internet
Having dened the internet as a essentially a horde of agents ating on a plethora
of omputers, it beomes lear how IPv4 and IPv6 are addressing superial
problems when ompared with those present in the rih and soially involved
internet as we have dened it. What follows is a list of the real problems with
the internet.
2.1 Trojan Everything
By far the biggest problem on the internet is that of trust. We annot trust that
a paket, le or email message has really ome from the agent that it laims,
or that it has not been subverted or interepted in transit. It is the lak of
trust whih makes the internet a dangerous plae to do business, work or play.
This environment of fear has serious ramiations for business[5℄. For justia-
tion of this premise look no further than the urrent emphasis on seurity and
seurity produts, suh as virus sanners, spam lters, digitally signed devie
drivers, ryptographi privay and authentiity protools and produts. The
list is almost endless, and yet pratially every one of them is atually just a
salve for the symptoms of the lak of trust endemi to the internet. If trust
ould be assured, blights suh as spam ould be wiped out almost instantly;
it would no longer be possible to hide behind open relays or on ompromised
omputers. The soure of the spam or phishing attempt would be revealed in
every delivered message. Virii and mal-ware are similarly the trojan version of
software. If an eetive mehanism existed for asertaining the ultimate soure
of a given piee of software, then no one would ever run maliious software in
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the rst plae.
2.2 Remote Data Aess and Manipulation
If the biggest problem with the internet is trusting what you get, then the
next biggest is atually getting what you want. The web is good for providing
read only aess to publi data. It is also fair for granting read only aess
to a restrited audiene. However, it is woeful at providing read/write aess
with anything like the ease and ontrol of suh aess to a loally resident le
system. There are a whole suite of protools whih attempt to provide suh
aess with varying foii and suess, suh as WebDAV[2℄, SFTP[12℄, NFS[9℄,
SMB/CIFS[6℄, CODA[11℄, rsyn[15℄, Klik[8℄ and ZeroInstall[7℄. Their sheer
quantity and diversity prolaim that there is some way to go before, from the
users perspetive, remotely resident data is equivalent in all ways to loally
resident data.
2.3 Software Installation and Maintenane
Assuming that you have got what you want, the next big problem is getting
what you've got to work. This disussion will fous on appliations, beause if
you an get appliations right, this all but guarantees solutions for douments
and data les. The rux of this problem is that downloading a bunh of software
appliations, inluding all their dependenies, and getting them to run on on
the same omputer at the same time is often diult or impossible. To demon-
strate some of the omplexities present, onsider the not unommon ase where
you want two versions of the same appliation - and their inompatible depen-
denies - on the one omputer. This is a surprisingly ommon situation on, for
example, web servers where the web server, database and sripting language
versions all have to be mathed. Even more ommon is the desire to run the
same appliation on multiple omputers with dierent proessor arhitetures
and/or operating systems. Conits aside, managing software installation with-
out administrator or super-user privileges is generally problemati, despite the
fat that there is no fundamental reason to demand suh aess to aomplish
the installation. To summarise, while appearing benign, software management
is atually one of the most painful ativities regularly required to be performed
on a omputer today. This is espeially true when ombined with the related
ogre of Operating System Rot, where many operating systems require omplete
re-installation in order to restore funtionality if too muh software has been
installed and uninstalled. A number of tehnologies have been devised to deal
with the manifold problems of software management, inluding ZeroInstall[7℄,
Klik[8℄, Java, AppDirs, ROX, numerous [Un℄Installers, BSD Ports, and ount-
less other pakaging systems. The degree of suess of these approahes varies.
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2.4 Bakup, Restore and Arhiving
This is the problem of getting bak something that you had in the past. The
goals of eetive data storage arhiving and reovery are problemati. It is not
just the question of an we get a le bak from a bakup tape made a week
ago. In the ideal world, people would like to be able to undo le system hanges
just like they undo typing in a word proessor. Reovering deleted, orrupted,
replaed, subverted or edited data are signiant, though perhaps subonsious,
goals of omputer users. Consider web server administrators who would like to
be able to rapidly reverse the hanges made by a group of hakers who have
defaed the orporate web site. Episodi bakups with lengthly o-line reovery
proesses are no longer satisfatory. This is evidened by the srabbling among
bakup vendors to attain true ontinuous and on line bakup and reovery. The
reality is the produts sold as ontinuous are almost invariably frequent episodi
rather than truly ontinuous. These systems are also notoriously expensive, in
part beause the bakup vendors know that people desire and are willing to pay
for ontinuous aess to the history of their data. This signiane of this issue
has also been appreiated in various researh environments, suh as Plan9[10℄,
where the authors aution the reader not to underestimate the produtivity
gains of having instant and on line aess to (in their ase) nightly bakups of
all data.
2.5 Congestion Instead of Cooperation
Finally, the internet has ongestion problems whih have little to do with the
available bandwidth. Numerous researhers have pointed out that the internet
has suient bandwidth to supply our needs, but that it is often poorly used.
As an example of this phenomena, onsider the manner in whih the internet
behaves when many users attempt to download the same resoure: Pathologial
ongestion ours instead of ooperation. The very ativity whih is so learly
shareable, the downloading of the same le, is that whih instead logs the
internet with a plurality of simultaneous and near idential data streams. By
way of solutions to this, we have mirrors whih suer from synhronisation and
non-transpareny issues. That is the end user may be aware that they are not
dealing with the original soure, and may be required to employ alternative
aess methods. IP Multiast has the right idea by sending the data only one.
However it is poorly suited to downloads whih ommene at dierent times.
Finally, the reent explosion of peer-to-peer (P2P) protools suh as Bit Torrent,
while possibly lessening ongestion at the bak bone tend to make the edge
ongestion muh worse.
2.6 The Spatial Addressing Paradigm Is Flawed
These problems exist today beause IPv4 is based on spaial addressing, i.e., it
addresses data based on its loation. Moreover, these problems will ontinue to
exist if the internet does eventually transition to IPv6, beause data will still be
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addressed by loation. It is true that many partial solutions exist, and in the
ase of ertain problems quite good solutions. It is also true that when IPv4 was
developed, that spaial addressing was the most eetive paradigm given the
limited speed and memory of omputers at the time. However, there is no single
oordinated solution based on spaial addressing whih is able to address the
problems, at their ause rather than merely symptomatially, with the internet
that have been desribed in this setion. A paradigm shift is required: The
urrent paradigm of spatial addressing must stand aside. Yet we must address
by some riterion. The remainder of this paper onsiders the benets of a ontent
addressing paradigm, and briey explores how the paradigm ould operate in
pratise.
3 The Content Addressed Environment
The ontent addressing paradigm addresses by the identity of data rather than
its storage loation. That is, stop asking for that thing stored in some disk
blok or on some server on the other side of the world - whih is really an
indiretion - and instead ask for the thing itself. Cryptographi hashes turn
out to be well suited to fullling this onept of identity
1
. They are designed
to produe a unique hash value, or identity, for any given input. The hash has
the important property of being muh shorter than the data it identies. This
simple dierene in addressing has profound impat on the way omputers and
networks of omputers an operate. This setion will disuss the immediate
benets that straight forwardly arise from suh a hange in methodology.
3.1 Uniation of Remote and Loal Data Storage
The rst onsequene is that we an all but remove the distintion between le
system and network resident storage. Present le systems speify data by where
it is stored on the disk. This implies that the data must be stored on the disk
to be aessible. Impliit then is that aessing network resident data requires
a dierent protool: Network resident storage beomes seond lass ompared
to loal storage. If instead we speify data by its identity, then the data an
be soured from anywhere, loal or not. An additional advantage of the hash
whih is not present in traditional loation addressed storage in that it allows
us to verify that the data we have read is orret by verifying that it produes
the expeted hash
2
: If even a single bit is altered the hash will be ompletely
dierent. If the hashes are long enough and are truly random, we have enough
address spae to be ondent in disriminating between all data in the world.
1
This is of ourse assuming that random ryptographi hashes exist. MD5 and more
reently SHA-1 have ome under inreasing re in the form of disoveries of ryptographi
weaknesses in them [14℄. For the purposes of this paper we assume that a suiently sound
ryptographi hash algorithm does exist.
2
Sun's new ZFS le system is a notable exeption to this, in that is stores ryptographi
hashes of data as well as their storage loation. However ZFS does not make full advantage
of the opportunities aorded by true ontent addressing.
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A good quality hash with length of perhaps 512 bits should be adequate in this
role: If 2
40
omputers generated 2
40
data items per seond for the next four
billion years, this would be only 2
40
× 2
40
× 2
32
× 365.24× 24× 60× 60 items,
whih is less than 2
140
. Using a 512 bit randomly distributed hash this would
put the probability of a hash ollision, i.e., a situation where two data would
generate the same hash and so be indistinguishable to the system at less than
10
−70
. In omparison the probability of winning a typial national lottery is
around 10
−7
. This means that it is 10
63
(the number one followed by 63 zeros)
times more probable that you will win your national lottery at least one in your
life time than a hash ollision will our in the next four billion years. This does
of ourse assume that the hash algorithm is sound, and that ollisions annot
be easily oered. A full disussion of this issue is outside of the sope of this
paper.
3.2 Eient On Line Continuous Bakup and Storage
The true potential of a ontent addressed le system omes when it is ombined
with persistent data storage, suh as proposed in Plan9. Unlike Plan9 however,
a ontent addressed data store does not require expliit bakups, and is not
onstrained to episodi aess to old data. This is beause the hash of a given
version of a le or diretory is a permanent and immutable identier: If you
hange a single bit in the le it will be identied by a new hash, and the old hash
will still identify the old version. All that needs to be done to provide on line
aess to historial data is to put the hash of the old version of a le somewhere
onvenient whenever the le is updated. One simple approah to this problem
is to make use of the well known meta-diretories present in every subdiretory.
Most omputer systems already have the . and .. diretories whih refer to
the same diretory and the parent diretory. In a loation addressed le system
this is easy to ahieve - these diretories just point to the le blok onerned.
However, there is a irularity problem when this approah is attempted in a
ontent addressed le system. This ours beause the hash of the urrent dire-
tory whih is available when you write a diretory listing is the hash from before
the write ours, not after. Therefore the . meta-diretory will atually point
to the previous version of the diretory. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where we
want to write a . entry into the diretory listing on the left, so we reord its
hash 0x7654 against the name .. But as a result the hash of the diretory has
hanged to 0xb219, leaving . pointing to the old version. Similar eets our
if a le hanges and asade all the way to the top of the le tree - always leaving
the previous hashes assoiated with the . diretories as a trail of bread rumbs
leading bak in time. This sheme an be further developed by augmenting the
. diretory as a pointer to the urrent diretory with a new meta-diretory,
perhaps ... whih points to an automatially reated and maintained dire-
tory whih ontains pointers to all versions of the diretory and named with
their date of modiation. This avoids having to onstrut exeptionally long
paths to get to anient versions of a le. In pratie this means that we an
use a path suh as Douments/.../14July200514:23.17.1/File.do instead of
7
fish = 0x8973
0xb219
fly/ = 0xcf31
...
fish = 0x8973
0x7654
fly/ = 0xcf31
...
.    = 0x7654
Figure 1: Using . Meta-Diretory to Failitate Aess to Old File Versions
Douments/./././././././././././././././././././././././File.do to refer to the
last good opy of some important le.
We have as a natural onsequene of ontent addressing, and with pratially
no eort at all, ahieved on line aess to truly ontinuous bakups. Provided
the nal baking data store is persistent, and grows faster than data usage, then
there is no limit to the depth of the bakups whih an be aessed. The total
storage spae required to introdue suh a regime is perhaps surprisingly smaller
than what might rst be expeted. This is beause we are addressing by ontent
and not loation, and therefore dupliate instanes of the same data does not
result in dupliated storage. This applies not only to spatial dupliation where
a le exists in more than one plae at the same time, but also to temporal
dupliation where a le may be large but may take several reurring forms over
time. If the ontent addressing is performed at a suitable blok level, then this
mitigation of redundant storage applies to the ontent within a le. A le full
of all zeroes will always require only one data blok. A new version of a le
with only one modied data blok will only require one new data blok. A
le modied and then reverted to a previous version will require no new data
bloks. Idential ode and data pages an be shared not only between instanes
of the same library or appliation, but among any ombination of libraries or
appliations that have the same binary ontent. In short, there are a number of
mehanisms by whih ontent addressing, omplete with on line storage of all
previous versions of all les may atually require less storage than traditional
le systems, and yet be able to make more eetive use of available storage
failities.
Content addressed storage systems lend themselves naturally to hierarhial
storage systems. This is of great relevane beause ombining the on line on-
tinuous bakup apability of a ontent addressed system with a well designed,
and preferably repliated, hierarhial storage system obviates the need for any
other bakup system. Better yet, the entire apaity that was one dediated to
massively redundant bakups (onsider for a moment the number of opies of
ommon operating system les that would be in the typial enterprise bakup
arhive) an now eetively be used as primary storage. In most organisations
8
this would involve from tera-bytes to exa-bytes of additional apaity: A well
designed and implemented bakup regime will usually ontain at least twie,
and often many more times, the apaity of the system it is proteting. This
apaity is well pried in terms of $/giga-byte, but is eetively latent to the
organisation. Beause of the independene of the storage in a ontent addressed
environment it is trivial to ontinuously add more apaity in order to aom-
modate demand. This signiantly simplies the data and bakup management
issues whih the omputer industry faes today.
A few nal notes about the apabilities of a le system whih automatially
reords its entire edit history are worth mentioning. One is that if a omputer
system is ompromised or subverted it beomes trivial to revert it to the last
known good state by traversing the unalterable le system history. Interestingly
it is also trivial to regain any logs or other reords whih intruders or saboteurs
might seek to alter or remove in order to oneal their ativities. The seond
interesting feature is that of version ontrol and management of rae onditions.
Sine the le system will reord eah event in a rae ondition where two people
try to simultaneously write to the same le, it is no longer possible to lose data
in suh a situation. It may even be possible to develop the le system to the
point where it an detet that a rae ondition has ourred, and either ag
the les or perhaps undertake automati resolution of any onits. Finally,
the immutable nature of storage in this ontext may have ramiations from a
ivil liberties perspetive, and also with regard to various national privay laws
whih an require the irrevoable destrution of data.
3.3 Fat Reursive AppDirs and Fast Copies
It has already been mentioned that ontent addressing makes it spae eient
to store redundant opies of either entire les or portions of them, and that this
eieny is an automati byprodut. This, when ombined with the unia-
tion of loal and remote storage, oers a ompelling opportunity to radially
simplify appliation management. AppDirs exist in several operating systems
today, most notably NeXT and Apple's OS-X, but inreasingly in various forms,
suh as the ROX desktop on UNIX and UNIX-like systems generally. AppDirs
simplify appliation installation by storing all the les whih are required for an
appliation to run in a single diretory. The diretory an be plaed anywhere
in the le system and still funtion. They an therefore be installed and unin-
stalled by unprivileged users without ontributing to operating system rot. In
pratie AppDirs are hamstrung by their inomplete enapsulation: Most ap-
pliations depend on other appliations or libraries, whih may or may not also
be available as AppDirs. Whihever the ase, the point remains that AppDirs
still often have external dependenies. In theory it is possible to orret this by
inluding every dependeny of a given appliation inside its AppDir. However
this is grossly ineient when you have multiple appliations sharing the same
dependenies. In ontrast, Content addressing however ompletely removes this
ineieny through the singular storage of redundant data. Hene it beomes
feasible to produe reursive AppDirs. Reursive AppDirs are AppDirs whih
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inlude their entire dependeny tree, or more preisely, the hash, and hene ad-
dress, of eah dependeny. Beause every referene to a spei dependeny will
be idential, dupliated dependenies (both within and among appliations) are
stored only one. Retrieval of suh large AppDirs over the network also ben-
ets from the properties of ontent addressed storage in that any portions of
the AppDir whih are already stored loally do not need to be fethed via the
network.
The onept of reursive AppDirs an be broadened to eiently aommo-
date ross platform ompatibility. This is aomplished by the natural property
of a hierarhial and network onneted ontent addressed storage system to
only feth data on demand. Therefore a Fat Reursive AppDir ould ontain
the omplete dependeny tree for your favourite appliation on seven versions
of Linux, Mirosoft Windows NT, 95,98,2k,XP and 2003, ve BSDs, four pro-
essor arhitetures, three byte orders, two CPUs and a hand held PDA - and
yet thanks to lazy fething it would take no longer to install or run than a lean
AppDir with only the ompilation you require. For appliations whih are not
suitable for implementation in Java, yet an be ported to multiple operating
systems this oers a near perfet solution to a broad range of software manage-
ment and operating system stability problems, without demanding onvergene
on a single operating system or proessor arhiteture.
3.4 Cahable Network Tra
Beause data is addressed by its identity rather than loation, it is possible for
the network to ahe reently seen data. If another agent requests the same data
it an safely reply with the ahed opy, beause it is provably asking for the
ahed data. This has the potential to profoundly improve network performane
in the fae of ongestion aused by repeated aess to idential data, e.g., when
the new version of a popular software distribution is released and simultaneously
downloaded by huge numbers of people. On the urrent internet this results in
the network equivalent of grid lok. In ontrast on a ontent addressed network
the data would be ahed in major routers and requests for the data would be
satised by the rst router ontated whih had ahed the data. In this way
data moves from its point of origin, with its potential bandwidth bottlenek, to
a myriad of points on the edge of the network where it is wanted. There are
two onsequenes of this whih are signiant besides generally speeding up the
internet: First, it beomes exeedingly diult to take a site o the internet
via a DoS or DDoS attak. This is beause after a short while the data is
being fed from many points instead of just the point under attak. The seond
eet is that beause of this ahing eet it is no longer neessary for web
servers serving popular stati ontent to require large and expensive internet
onnetions. The average itizen using a dial up modem ould serve up stati
ontent whih ould be aessed by millions of people simultaneously.
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3.5 File Mapped Human Interfaes
The non-redundany and manner in whih hange in a ontent addressed le
system an be deteted by monitoring le and diretory hashes an be harnessed
to failitate the prodution of eient new tehnologies whih address a variety
of problems. One example of this is human interfaes. In this ontext, human
interfaes are dened as the mehanisms whih a program uses to ommuniate
with a human. This inludes prinipally the traditional video display, keyboard
and mouse. Presently programming these devies, and the video display in
partiular, is performed in a myriad dierent ways on dierent systems; for ev-
idene of this onsider that the three predominant operating systems of today
eah use radially dierent display libraries and protools. We have the Win-
dows' GDI, UNIX/Linux's X11 and Apple's Aqua. What is interesting is that
eah of these is attempting to provide the same thing: a mehanism for pro-
grammers to desribe to the operating system how to display ertain data and
to reeive feedbak from the user. Even if onstrained to the WIMP
3
paradigm,
the programming mehanisms required dier greatly, and are often surprisingly
indiret. Ultimately the programmer attempts to desribe the sene to be dis-
played to the omputer. Suh senes are hierarhial ompositions of a relatively
few basi elements, suh as window, text, button, image and so on. This type of
desription an be readily desribed by a le system, where diretories represent
branhes and les the leaf nodes. If this is done, then it will be possible to unify
not only the le system and network, but also the most signiant remaining
input and output hannels.
If a graphial display is desribed as a series of nested diretories and les,
representing omponents suh as windows, images and text, it is mandatory
that it be eient to transform this into its visual form. If a ontent addressed
le system is used to represent a display, it beomes easy to ahe the rendered
version of the display using the hash of its representation as the key. More-
over, this proess an be performed reursively, so that a display that ontains
idential omponents need render eah unique omponent only one; subsequent
renderings are performed rapidly by opying them from the ahe, even within
the same display. This ahing of displays and their omponents makes it ef-
ient to update a hanging display, as only the hanged omponents require
rendering. Further, if a display or omponent hanges to a dierent, but previ-
ously rendered one, it an again be rendered by opying from the ahe. Beause
drawing the display in this way is performed by reursively rendered from the
top level down, the ahing an our at any level of omposition, and automati-
ally re-uses the highest level of omposition possible in any given irumstane.
As an example, moving a window ontaining a omplex omposition would re-
sult in only the window frame altering (hanging oordinates), while all the
internal ompositions would remain unhanged. Therefore the ontents of the
window would be redrawn from the ahe rather than rendered again. Further
eienies an be realised by ollapsing small les into their parent diretory
to produe light weight les (LWF). The use of LWFs redues the number of
3
Windows, Ions, Menus and Pointer.
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blok retrievals required to obtain the neessary sene data.
Input and event handling is ahieved using the same proess and ahing
algorithm as for rendering, exept that the produt is an event map rather than
a rendered display. The event map is simply the sub-division and appropriation
of the visual real estate to the elements and event reeptors in the sene. Event
reeptors are simply les in the diretory hierarhy whih exist solely for the
display engine to deposit events in order to ommuniate them to the program.
Display eieny and funtionality an be enhaned by the addition of a simple
sripting language whih allows seleted events to be handled ompletely by the
lient side. Theoretially any event whih does not require the retrieval of new
display information an be dealt with in this way. A list of events suited to loal
proessing inludes seletion of radio buttons, menu fade in, fade out, pop up
and pop down, tool tip display and retration, srolling and zooming of panes in
response to sroll bar ativity. Importantly, these an be proessed loally are
also those where the introdution of lateny has the largest degrading eet on
interativity. Indeed, it would be possible to have the le hierarhy desribe not
only the visual omponents of the sene, but also appliation state and program,
failitating the exible ombination of loal and remote omputation.
Suh a rih and preise desription of a sene, ombined with its lear delin-
eation between interfae desription and visualised representation would make
this approah well suited as a replaement to HTML. The user interfaes would
be riher and more interative than those produed with AJAX, and yet have
signiantly redued omplexity.
Finally, the lear division of the desription and rendering layers also stand
to make aessibility and aess by restrited devies (suh as small embedded
devies) muh easier to implement. Essentially any format of representation
ould be implemented beause the all of the neessary information is present in
the sene desription. The standard graphial WIMP renderer ould be replaed
with a speeh based renderer for the visually impaired, or a text based renderer
for low bandwidth appliations, or in an instane of fat following tion, it
would be possible to reate a glyph based rendered like the one in the Matrix
movies.
4 Agent Identiation and Seurity
4.1 Publi Key Addressing
The previous setion has onsidered some of the benets whih may result from
adopting a ontent addressing paradigm for general purpose omputing. By
applying a similar philosophy to network identiation and authentiation it
an be oneived that what agents really want with network identiation is to
be able to selet the agent or agents they wish to ommuniate with, and then to
be able to ommuniate with them seurely and ondently. In suh a framework
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the onept of eah omputer rather than agent having a digital address is an
indiretion at best. Rather we want eah person (natural or otherwise) to have
their own address. Ideally it should not be feasible to impersonate another
person's digital address. A natural hoie for the digital address is the publi
key from a publi/private ryptographi key pair.
Publi/private ryptography works on the basis of reating two binary pat-
terns. One of whih allows the enryption of data, and the other deryption.
The enrypting key an be made publi with little risk of any third party being
able to derypt anything whih is proteted by the enrypting key. Further,
in many shemes it is possible to use the private key to sign data suh that is
annot be modied without breaking the signature. These are the neessary
ingredients for making seure and ondential bidiretional ommuniations.
With the benet of publi/private ryptography a person an generate a key
pair and release the publi key to the world. This allows any other person to
enrypt data suh that only the rst person an derypt it. Conversely, any
data whih the rst person sends to any other person an be signed with their
private key to prove that they were the originator. This approah is already
in use widely, for example in the Seure Sokets Layer (SSL[4℄) whih is used to
protet web tra using the HTTPS[3℄ protool.
4.2 No Need For Central Authorities
An Ahilles heel in the traditional appliation of asymmetri ryptography is
the highly entralised and at times problemati ertiate authority struture.
Certiates must be obtained before you an vouh for your own identity, but
this is not neessary. For example, when you telephone your nanial institu-
tion the only assumption they make is that your telephone all is not being
listened to or subjet to hijaking by maliious third parties; the line is assumed
to be reasonably seure and ondential. Banks do not (generally) require your
telephone number and name to be listed together in some entrally adminis-
trated repository. Rather they use the ondentiality and seurity oered by
the phone line as a platform for asking you a series of questions whih do verify
your identity (postal address, mother's maiden name, et). This same poliy
an be applied to network identiation; let users reate any seure and private
onnetion and determine the trust relationships as they go. This elides the
requirement for a entral ertifying authority for most users, and any large in-
stitutional organisations, suh as banks, whih still prefer to obtain ertiates
from a trusted authority would be able to do so. The net result of this is that
end users an join a network whih authentiates and addresses by publi ryp-
tographi key simply by generating a random key pair and keeping their private
key private. There is no longer need for DHCP, entralised IP address alloa-
tion or similar shemes. Using key pairs large enough to oer medium to long
term seurity, perhaps 2048 bits, results in a massive address spae suh that all
moleules in the solar system ould have individual addresses with pratially
zero probability of address ollision. From a ivil liberties and global equality
perspetive the removal of the need for entral authorities and the need to au-
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thorise people joining the internet is a tremendous gain. While it is true that
you an be ertain of the party you are ommuniating in suh an environment,
anonymity an be obtained as required by generating a new temporary key pair
for the neessary duration, after whih the inognito identity an be ompletely
disarded.
4.3 Mobility, Trust and Seurity
The onept of addressing by publi key rather than by the omputer you are
onneted to has several synergies with a unied omputing environment as
introdued in this paper. First, it provides a global authentiation mehanism
for the ontent addressed storage environment. That is publi keys an be used
in the plae of mahine loal user and group ids (groups are just virtual people).
This makes it possible to truly make loal and remote storage equivalent, as ne
grained seurity poliies an be equally applied to both. If group membership
is represented by holding a ertiate from the group vouhing for membership
then we atually gain some valuable semantis urrently not readily available.
Certiates an have begin and end time points. This means it would be possible
to grant membership to a group for only a limited period of time, after whih the
membership impliitly and automatially is revoked. The only requirement is
that any server whih stores your data must honour the permissions set on les it
stores. Files an be signed with the private key of the reator to authentiate the
permissions and restritions applied. File servers an then demand that a validly
signed le blok be presented as evidene that a lient is entitled to the ontent
of a le. This also has the result of all les and appliations being impliitly
signed by someone. Reall that hanging a single bit in a le will hange its
hash, whih will then hange the hash of the diretory ontaining it, asading
up the entire diretory tree. Therefore it is impossible to add, remove, modify or
alter the permissions of even a single le in an entire appliation without it being
notied. Eah user an hoose whih agents they will onsider as trustworthy
software publishers. By plaing these heks into the operating system virii and
mal-ware an be ontrolled or even eradiated. Yet at the same time this form
of trusted omputing is open and deentralised in nature while still oering the
attrative fruit of the losed platforms.
Having established true and seure global authentiation, network mobility
omes for free. We have already desribed how using publi keys as network
addresses reates the framework for seure and authentiated ommuniation.
This means that trust is based on expliit trust relationships rather than loation
in the network topology. Sine trust and seurity are independent of loation,
virtual private networks and rewalls are both ompletely obviated. An agent
may reloate anywhere in the network without aeting any trust relationships.
Conversely, no person may attempt to aquire trust relationships by moving (or
pretending to move) loser on the network. This framework of expliit rather
than impliit formation of trust relationships simply makes good seurity sense.
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4.4 Proteting Identity and Privay at Home and Away
The lynh pin in this authentiation framework is the eetive protetion of
eah person's private key. Storing the private key on a onventional omputer
is possible, and may be justiable in many irumstanes. However a more
robust solution is required in order to fully apitalise on the opportunity for
transparent global mobility. This is a partiularly diult problem as without
the proprietary Trustworthy Computing platforms it is not reasonable to trust
any devie that you do not have adequate ontrol over. In fat in many ases
it is not even wise to trust a omputer whih you do ontrol as it may still be
subverted. To takle this, some additional hardware devie is required whih
an be fully trusted and ontrolled by the owner. If suh a devie ontained
the ryptographi keys and signing hardware it would be possible to operate a
omputer in onnetion with the devie suh that the omputer asks the devie
to sign outgoing pakets and to derypt inoming pakets along with any other
proedure whih requires the use of the private key. This makes the software
required on suh an identity token relatively simple and learly dened. The
token would generate the key pair internally, and be designed in suh a way
that it annot reveal the private key.
The use of an identity token provides a onvenient manner in whih to realise
onvenient global mobility. Note that by using a physial token with perhaps
a simple pin number or biometri password whih is programmed into the
devie itself that two fator authentiation is instituted, suient for most or-
ganisations seurity requirements. In addition, the token an theoretially be
inserted into any reasonably trusted omputer. The token provides your publi
key as your digital identity, and signs any requests for data you may want. The
omputer therefore has all that it requires in order gain aess to your data
on your behalf. Owing to the uniation of le, network and graphial user
interfaes it is trivial to display your urrent omputer session to you anywhere
in the world. With the use of Fat Reursive AppDirs it is also straight forward
to run appliations loally on the omputer you have onneted to - without
requiring administrator rights on that omputer.
It is not always wise to trust a omputer whih you do not ontrol. Therefore
for ompletely seure global roaming the identity token ould be supplemented
with a simple note book type omputer. This omputer would require only
a very simple operating system whih an ommuniate with the ontent ad-
dressed network. Its sole job would be to provide rendering of a user session and
aept keyboard and mouse input from the user: It is a thin terminal whih an
be used anywhere in the world. By ontrolling the user interfae, partiularly
the keyboard and mouse, and enrypting and authentiating all tra the se-
urity loop is losed: in no plae an user input or server output be interepted.
This approah would make the prodution ost and mass of suh a unit very
low ompared to a fully edged mobile omputer, yet would still oer a rih
user interfae. Finally, it would be possible to reate a hybrid approah where
the identity token sports a USB port to aept keyboard and mouse and then
on its seure platform enrypts the user input for transmission.
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5 Conlusions and Future Diretions
We have introdued CANE, a ontent addressed network environment, whih we
have argued an address the major deits of the urrent internet environment:
* Trojaned orrespondene, ommuniation and identity are retied
by addressing people using publi key ryptographi keys.
* Remote data aess and manipulation is made a rst lass itizen
through the ombination of ontent addressing and the seure global
identiation attained through using publi-private ryptographi
identities.
* Software installation and management is made trivial through Fat
Reursive AppDirs whih are in turn made eient by ontent ad-
dressing and rst lass aess to remote data.
* Truly on line bakup and self servie aess to historial data, i.e.,
on line restoration of bakups, and long term arhiving of data are
presented as natural onsequenes of a well developed ontent ad-
dressed le store.
* Network ongestion in the fae of redundant data aess is shown to
be turned into ooperation by the reusable data pakets in a ontent
addressed network.
In addition the number of protools and tehnologies required to implement
the desirable features of the internet is dramatially redued. Virus sanners,
rewalls, bakup and restore software, and network le protools are among the
many made redundant. Yet at the same time the inherent seurity is inreased
to a level appropriate given the hostile nature of the internet. Moreover, as is
with any protool, CANE ould be tunnelled over the existing IPv4 to provide
an feasible transition strategy.
This paper has desribed the onepts rather than the implementation of
a ontent addressed network environment. Implementation is the next logial
step, and is urrently being pursued along with onsideration of the problems
surrounding the seletion of an appropriate hash algorithm. Perhaps the largest
hallenge to be addressed is that of routing. By deentralising network address-
ing and introduing a vast non-geographially bound address spae the task of
routers is made diult. Edge routing is relatively trivial, however bakbone
routers may require giga-bytes of memory and hardware aelerated ryptog-
raphy in order to funtion eetively. This might be solved by leveraging the
existing IPv4 infrastruture to provide not only arriage, but also land marks
to failitate eient routing of the non-geographially bound CANE addresses.
Collaborations are invited in this and any other area of the renement and
realisation of a ontent addressed network environment.
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